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GIBBON AND MOHAMMEDANISM
by Beverley E. Smith
Edward Gibbon, whose fame as the greatest of the English
 
historians is secured by The Decline and Fall of the Roman
 Empire, has been called “the most
 
important and most influen ­
tial of militant unbelievers.”1 In his own time, Gibbon’s attacks
 upon religion, especially Christianity, evoked an immediate and
 violent storm of bitter protests, which, in a letter to his step
­mother, Gibbon described as being “as hot a canonading as can
 be pointed against Washington.”2 Indeed, Christian apologists,
 in a decidedly un-Christian manner, leveled repeated volleys of
 criticism at the calm little historian; and at his death a contem
­porary, Hannah More, “gave thanks that she had escaped
 undefiled by his acquaintance.”3 Even today, almost two hun
­dred years after his death, 
an
 article concerning Gibbon rarely  
appears which does not include some, sort of apology for his
 treatment of Christianity. From his chapters on Christianity,
 Gibbon’s critics have drawn all general pronouncements con
­cerning the historian’s religious opinions; very few, if any, have
 examined to any considerable extent his attitude toward Mo
­hammedanism. Perhaps most of these commentators prefer not
 to deal with Gibbon’s discussion of the rise and progress of
 Mohammedanism because they find there an evident sympathy
 with certain aspects of the faith, a sympathy which is contrary
 
1 Roger Lloyd, “Gibbon and the Christians,
”
 London Quarterly and Holbom  
Review, January, 1937, p. 41.
2 Edward Gibbon, The Letters of Edward Gibbon, ed. J. E. Norton (New York:
 
The Macmillan Co., 1956), II, 129.
3D. M. Low, Edward Gibbon: 1737-1794
 
(New York: Random House, 1937),-  
p. 349.
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to their notions of
 
the historian’s contempt for  religion. It is the  
opinion of the present writer, however, that a detailed examina
­tion of Gibbon’s treatment of Islam 
will
 show that he is con ­
sistent in his attitude toward religion, that he uses the same
 trenchant irony to criticize in Mohammedansim the very things
 that he criticizes in Christianity, and that his evident sympathy
 for certain aspects of the Islamic faith is in complete accord
 with his view of religion as a whole.
According to Gibbon, the religion preached by the prophet
 
Mohammed is “compounded of an eternal truth, and a neces
­sary fiction, THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE GOD, AND THAT
 MAHOMET IS THE APOSTLE OF GOD.”4 Gibbon is sympa
­thetic toward the idea of one God, which seemed to him more
 consistent with reason than the compound deities of other
 religions: “The religions of the world were guilty, at
 
least in the  
eyes of the prophet [and in those of the historian as well], of
 giving sons, or daughters, or companions, to the supreme God”
 (III, 375). The statement of the unity of God which forms the
 popular creed of Mohammedanism is, according to Gibbon, a
 concept to which a philosopher might subscribe. Nevertheless,
 the historian ironically states that this creed, which is “free
 from ambiguity,” is “defined with metaphysical precision by
 the interpreters of the Koran” (III, 375). As he continues, Gib
­bon again smiles at the petty efforts of those involved in the
 resolution of religious problems. Following his statement that
 Mohammedans embrace the doctrine of predestination, Gibbon
 mentions that they, like the Christians, 
struggle
 with the “com ­
mon difficulties” of reconciling an omniscient God with their
 belief in the freedom of the human will and of explaining the
 presence of evil in a world created by a deity infinite in both
 power and goodness (III, 376).
4 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed.
 
Rev. H. H. Milman (New York: Harper & 
Bros.,
 1843), I, 250. All subsequent  
references to the Decline and Fall will be to this edition and will contain only the
 volume and page number, inserted parenthetically 
in
 the text.
Although Gibbon never overtly states the point, it is evident
 
from his discussion of the traditions of Mohammedanism that
2
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the religion is an eclectic one, made up of borrowings from
 
Judaism, Christianity, and Arabian Paganism. Mohammed, in
 Gibbon’s view, combined into a single system various elements
 from the religions which he encountered on every hand. It is
 clear that Gibbon has his tongue in 
his
 cheek in this passage  
dealing
 
with the background of Mohammedanism:
The liberality of Mahomet allowed to his predeces
­
sors the same credit which he claimed for himself;
 and the chain of inspiration was prolonged from the
 
fall
 of Adam to the promulgation of the Koran. Dur ­
ing that
 
period, some rays of prophetic light had been  
imparted to one hundred and twenty-four thousand
 of the elect, discriminated by their respective measure
 of virtue and grace; three hundred and thirteen
 apostles were sent with a special commission to recall
 their country from idolatry and vice; one hundred
 and four volumes have been dictated by the Holy
 Spirit; and six legislators of transcendent brightness
 have announced to mankind the six successive revela
­tions of various rites, but of one immutable religion.
 The authority and station of Adam, Noah, Abraham,
 Moses, Christ, and Mahomet, 
rise
 in just gradation  
above each other; but whosoever hates or rejects any
 one of the prophets is numbered with the infidels.
 (III, 376)
By including Christ and himself in his list, Mohammed excludes
 
from the ranks of the faithful both the Jews and the Christians,
 on whose traditions he has drawn for
 
his own religion.
Gibbon proceeds to a consideration of the generation and
 
character of the Koran, the sacred book of the Mohammedan
 religion. The historian’s straightforward narrative, 
in
 which he  
never once questions the authenticity of the “facts” he is relat
­ing, is obviously intended to condemn the Koran as a specious
 production dictated by the demands of expediency:
The substance of the Koran, according to himself
 
[Mohammed] or his disciples, is uncreated and eter-
3
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nal; subsisting in the essence of the Deity, and
 
inscribed with a pen of tight on the table of his ever
­lasting decrees. A paper copy in a volume of 
silk
 and  
gems, was brought down to the lowest heaven by the
 angel Gabriel, who, under the Jewish economy had
 indeed been despatched on the most important
 errands; and this trusty messenger successively re
­vealed the chapters and verses to the Arabian prop
­het. Instead of a perpetual and
 
perfect  measure of  the  
divine will, the fragments of the Koran were
 produced at the discretion of Mahomet; each revela
­tion is suited to the emergencies of his policy or pas
­sion; and all contradiction is removed by the saving
 maxim, that any text of Scripture is abrogated or
 modified by any subsequent passage. The word of
 God, and of the apostle, was diligently recorded by
 his disciples on
 
palm-leaves and the shoulder-bones of  
mutton; and the pages without order or connexion,
 were cast into a domestic chest in the custody of one
 of his wives. (III, 377—italics mine)
The scattered fragments of the sacred writings were collected
 
and published after the death of Mohammed; thus their order
 was uncertain, and the consequent difficulties of interpreta
­tion—particularly in the light of the fact that subsequent pas
­sages modified earlier ones—are obvious. The problem is unsatis
­factorily resolved by Gibbon’s ironic statement that the Koran
 enjoyed the “miraculous privilege of... [an] incorruptible text”
 (III, 377). Continuing his discussion of the Koran, Gibbon
 states that either the enthusiasm or the vanity of Mohammed
 prompted him to base the validity of his mission on the stylistic
 merit of the sacred
 
book: “the prophet...audaciously challenges  
both men and angels to imitate the beauties of a single page,
 and presumes to assert that God alone could dictate his incom
­parable performance” (III, 377). The boasts of the prophet not
­withstanding, Gibbon finds the best portions of the Koran
 inferior to the beauties of the book of Job. In a question, he
 further expresses his doubt that the Koran was authored by the
 Deity: “If the composition of
 
the Koran exceed the faculties of  
man, to what superior
 
intelligence should  we ascribe the Iliad of  
Homer or
 
the Phillipics of Demosthenes?” (III, 378)
4
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Having indicated his belief that the Koran is the production
 
of a mortal man rather than of an immortal god, Gibbon passes
 on to the subject of miracles. In his discussion of the miraculous
 powers traditionally ascribed to Christ and the early Christian
 fathers, Gibbon had dealt severely with the 
claims
 of the  
Church, and he is no less severe with Mohammedanism. In spite
 of the fact that Mohammed was frequently called upon to
 perform some prodigy and thus confirm his 
divine
 mission, he  
was, according to Gibbon, unable to comply with any of these
 requests (III, 378). Nevertheless, the miraculous gifts of the
 prophet were affirmed by 
his
 votaries, especially those who  
lived and wrote some years after his death. Gibbon’s lack of
 credence is obvious as he lists the miracles associated with
 Mohammed:
They [the followers of Mohammed] believe or affirm
 
that trees went forth to meet him; that he was saluted
 by stones; that water rushed from his fingers; that he
 fed the hungry, cured the sick and raised the dead;
 that a beam groaned to him; that a camel complained
 to him; that a shoulder of
 
mutton informed him of its  
being poisoned; and that both animate and inanimate
 nature were equally subject to the apostle of God.
(I
II, 378)
After discussing several miraculous journeys which Moham
­
med is supposed to have made, Gibbon examines the Moham
­medan version of the doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul. According to the teachings of Mohammed, on the day of
 judgment the bodies of those who have died will be reunited
 with their souls. He makes no attempt, however, to explain how
 this reunion will be effected, and philosophically “relies on the
 omnipotence of the Creator, whose word can reanimate the
 breathless clay, and collect the innumerable atoms, that no
 longer retain their form or substance” (III, 381). Although
 Gibbon probably did not 
believe
 in the immortality of the soul,  
the Mohammedan attitude of resignation likely appealed to
 him; nevertheless, he cannot forbear adding one sarcastic com
­ment: “The intermediate state of the soul is hard to decide; and
 those who most firmly believe her immaterial nature, are at a
5
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loss to understand how she can think or act
 
without the agency  
of the 
organs
 of sense” (III, 381). This being the case, Gibbon  
proceeds to discuss the soul after its reunion with the body.
 Mohammed, according to Gibbon, is wrongly accused by his
 adversaries not only of extending the hope of salvation to all
 men, but of “asserting the blackest heresy, that every man who
 believes in God, and accomplishes good works, may expect in
 the last day a favourable sentence” (III, 381). As Gibbon sarcas
­tically points out, however, these accusations are unjust, for
 “such rational indifference is ill adapted to the character of a
 fanatic; nor is it probable that a messenger from heaven should
 depreciate the value and necessity of his own revelation” (III,
 381).
According to the doctrine set forth in the Koran, belief in
 
God is one with belief in Mohammed, and the “good works” are
 specifically defined by the prophet. Thus, for the Moham
­medan, belief in God and the performance of
 
good works imply  
acceptance of Islam. On the day of judgment, all infidels will be
 immediately consigned to hell; only the Mohammedans will be
 judged. Those of the faithful who are judged worthy will 
pass into paradise, while the guilty will be punished in the “first and
 mildest of the seven hells” (III, 382). The sojourn of the guilty
 in this “mildest” hell is only temporary, however. After their
 sins have been expiated by varying terms of penance, they, too,
 enter into paradise, for Mohammed 
has
 promised “that all his  
disciples, whatever may be their sins, shall be saved...from eter
­nal damnation” (III, 382). Gibbon is not especially pleased with
 the Mohammedan paradise, as his ironic description shows:
Instead of inspiring the blessed inhabitants with a
 
liberal taste for harmony and science, conversation
 and friendship, he [Mohammed] idly celebrates the
 pearls and diamonds, the robes of 
silk,
 palaces of  
marble, 
dishes
 of gold, rich wines, artificial dainties,  
numerous attendants, and the whole train of sensual
 and costly luxury, which becomes insipid to the
 owner, even in the short period of this mortal life.
 Seventy-two Houris, or black-eyed girls, of resplen
­dent beauty, blooming youth, virgin purity, and
 
6
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exquisite sensibility, will be created for the use of the
 
meanest believer; a moment of pleasure will be pro
­longed to a thousand years, and his faculties 
will
 be  
increased a hundred fold, to render
 
him worthy of  his  
felicity. Notwithstanding a vulgar prejudice, the gates
 of heaven will be open to both sexes, but Mahomet
 has not specified the male companions of the female
 elect, lest he should either alarm the jealousy of their
 former husbands, or disturb their felicity, by the sus
­picion of
 
an everlasting marriage. (III, 382)
In commenting on the nature of the Mohammedan afterlife,
 
Gibbon cannot resist an oblique jab at the Christian monks:
 “This image of a carnal paradise has provoked the indignation,
 perhaps the envy, of the monks: they declaim against the
 impure religion of Mahomet; and his modest apologists are
 driven to the poor excuse of figures and allegories” (III, 382).
 In spite of the “figures and allegories,” however, Gibbon points
 out that the majority of the faithful adhere to the literal inter
­pretation of the Koran, saying that the resurrection of the
 mortal body of man would be useless if paradise were not a
 sensual existence.
The first conversions made by Mohammed were of those
 
persons closest to him, such as his wife and servant. Gibbon
 deprecates the value of such conquests by implying that the
 prophet’s wife was bound to follow her husband’s wishes, and
 by overtly stating that the servant was “tempted by the pros
­pect of freedom” (III, 383). In gaining other converts, Moham
­med preached in public and private, asserting “the liberty of
 conscience, and... [disclaiming] the use of religious violence”
 (III, 383-384). For his preaching, Mohammed was mercilessly
 persecuted by the votaries of the established religion and was
 forced to flee from Mecca
 
to Medina, where he and his doctrine  
were reverently embraced by the people. As time passed, the
 new religion gained more and more followers, all of whom held
 the person of the prophet in such high regard that the deputy of
 the city of Mecca
 
was astonished (III, 386). Apparently Gibbon  
was also astonished at the reverence accorded Mohammed, for,
 with evident sarcasm, he adds a word of explanation: “The
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devout fervour of enthusiasm acts with more energy...than the
 
cold and formal servility of courts” (III, 386). Eventually, the
 people invested Mohammed with the office of
 
sovereign, giving  
him the power to make war, which action conveniently coin
­cided with a divine command to propagate the religion of
 
Islam  
by means of warfare. Gibbon’s comments on the prophet’s re
­versal of his position with respect to the use of violence clearly
 show the historian’s belief that Mohammed’s earlier preaching
 of nonviolence resulted from his own lack of strength (III,
 386-387).
In the prosecution of 
his
 holy war, Mohammed offered his  
enemies their choice of friendship (which meant payment of
 tribute for the privilege of continuing in the worship of their
 accustomed religion), submission to Islam, or destruction. As
 Gibbon points out, “the clemency of the prophet was decided
 by 
his
 interest” (III, 387). By uniting the professions of mer ­
chant and robber, Mohammed continued to win converts:
From all sides the roving Arabs were allured to the
 
standard of religion and plunder: the apostle sanc
­tified the license of embracing the female captives as
 their wives or concubines; and the enjoyment of
 wealth and beauty was a feeble type of the joys of
 paradise prepared for the valiant martyrs of the faith.
(I
II, 387)
In one battle, Mohammed is said to have been aided by a host
 
of angels. The tone of
 
Gibbon’s comment in a footnote is worth  
noting:
The loose expressions of the Koran allow the com
­
mentators to fluctuate between the numbers of 1000,
 3000, or 9,000 angels; and the smallest of these might
 suffice for the slaughter of seventy of the Koreish.
 Yet the same scholiasts confess, that this angelic band
 was not
 
visible to any mortal eye. (III, 388n.)
In the holy war, not even former allies were spared, although
 
they often made the mistake of expecting clemency from their
8
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former friends; but, as Gibbon says, “fanaticism obliterates the
 
feelings of humanity” (III, 390). Mohammed was eventually
 strong enough to attack Mecca, but was nevertheless defeated
 when he did so. He concluded a truce of ten years with the
 leaders of the city, but when his forces were augmented by
 other conquests, he attacked again. His efforts were successful
 this time, and, as the victor, he was easily able to convict the
 losers—whom he branded as “idolaters”—of having broken the
 treaty (III, 391). Gibbon ironically praises the clemency of
 Mohammed in awarding his portion of the plunder to the de
­feated forces—if they would accept Islam as the true faith. The
 position of these unfortunates is obvious; the prophet coerced
 them into acceptance through force and bribery. Realizing this,
 Gibbon goes on to say that “Mecca was sincerely converted to
 the profitable religion of the Koran” (III, 393—italics mine).
Gibbon describes the death of Mohammed in such a manner
 
as to firmly establish the prophet’s character as a religious
 fanatic (he states that to the moment of his death Mohammed
 maintained “the faith of an enthusiast”), and in the process, the
 historian reflects further doubt upon the sacred writings of
 Islam, pointing out that Mohammed dictated a “divine book,
 the sum and accomplishment of all his revelations,” near the
 close of his life, “at a moment when his faculties were 
visibly impaired” (III, 395).
Having brought his narrative to the death of Mohammed,
 
Gibbon proposes to assess the virtues and the faults of the
 prophet, in order to determine “whether the title of
 
enthusiast  
or impostor more properly belongs to that extraordinary man”
 (III, 396). It is worth noting that to Gibbon, writing in the
 eighteenth century, both terms were odious. In his summary,
 the historian states that “the use of fraud, and perfidy, of
 cruelty and injustice, were often subservient to the propagation
 of the faith” (III, 397). Further, Gibbon calls Mohammed to
 task for his ambition and for his abandon with women: “A
 special revelation dispensed him from the laws which he had
 imposed on his nation; the female sex, without reserve, was
 abandoned to his desires” (III, 397-398). Gibbon does, how
­ever, praise the efforts of the prophet to keep 
his
 religion within  
9
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the bounds of reason, although his efforts in this area were not
 
always successful.
After the death of Mohammed, whose personal magnetism
 
must have been immense, his successors experienced some diffi
­culty in restraining the people, who threatened to return to
 their old religion. The faith of the converts did not waver long,
 however, for, as Gibbon neatly puts it, “The appearance of a
 military force revived and confirmed the loyalty of the faithful”
 (III, 408). Eventually the force of arms was no longer necessary
 to prevent the people from deserting the ranks of Islam, and the
 Mohammedans persevered in their religion from force of habit;
 the arms were used as before in the propagation of the faith
 through the holy war.
Although there are aspects of Mohammedanism which Gib
­
bon criticizes, he is on the whole rather more tolerant of this
 Arabian religion than of Christianity. There are several reasons
 for his attitude. Mohammedanism is more than merely a
 religion; it is a system of jurisprudence which forms the 
basis for all civil law in the Islamic community. Thus, in Gibbon’s
 eyes, Mohammedanism tended to perpetuate the order and har
­mony of the state, while Christianity tended to destroy it.
 Further, there is no organized priesthood in the Mohammedan
 religion (III, 380); the judicial authority devolves upon the
 individual believer. As many commentators have pointed out,
 Gibbon has strong objections to the clergy and monks of the
 Christian religion, and it would seem that any religion which
 excluded them might come nearer winning his approval than
 Christianity. Finally, in Gibbon’s own words, the religion of
 Mohammed seemed “less inconsistent with reason, than the
 creed of mystery and superstition, which, 
in
 the seventh cen ­
tury, disgraced the simplicity of the Gospel” (III, 457).
Thus, Gibbon’s ironic barbs are not directed at Christianity
 
alone, and those scholars whose investigations have led them to
 conclude otherwise have overlooked the remarkable consistency
 with which the historian criticizes other religious systems.
 Further, they have failed to approach Gibbon’s history with a
 clear conception of the author’s historical method. Edward Gib
­
10
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bon, truly a product of his age, brought to historiography a
 
mind fortified by Humean scepticism and an implicit faith in
 reason, guided by experience, as the only means of discovering
 truth. As a historian, Gibbon was, of course, primarily con
­cerned with the statement of factual, historical truth; and his
 empirical approach quite naturally led him to deprecate any
­thing which had no basis in sensory experience, or which con
­tributed to the degradation of the reason. In the eighteenth
 century, reason was opposed by passion, and it was Gibbon’s
 contention that this latter faculty was the parent of religious
 enthusiasm; with the increase of religious fervor, there was a
 corresponding loss of the capacity to reason. Thus Gibbon was
 led to criticize religion both by his temperament and by his
 approach to history.
As has been stated before, Gibbon is consistent in his
 
criticism of religion. He is the champion of civil and intellectual
 liberty, and he views organized religion as an attempt to curb
 these freedoms. Thus, regardless of what religious system he is
 considering, he attacks the same things: the overthrow of reason
 by passion, the inherent intellectual tyranny of the system,
 bigoted intolerance, and superstitious zeal. Gibbon’s mind is
 that of the rational, eighteenth-century sceptic, which looks
 askance at any system of thought or way of life which goes
 beyond the present life and the realm of man’s sensory exper
­ience. It was this disposition of mind
 
which led the historian, in  
his famous chapters on Christianity, to examine only the  
“secondary causes” (I, 250) of the spread of
 
Christianity, and in  
his examination to cast doubts at every turn upon the numerous
 accounts in the ecclesiastical writings of antiquity of divine
 intercession in human affairs, miraculous prodigies, and other
 suspensions of the natural order of the universe. In addition,
 Gibbon’s antipathy for Christianity is due in part to its dis
­ruptive influence on the civil government of the Roman empire.
 The zeal of the early Christians for martyrdom, he feels, led
 them to invite persecution. Further, the internal dissensions of
 the various Christian factions, the struggle for supremacy
 between the “orthodox” and the “heretics” contributed in no
 small degree to the historian’s unfavorable opinion of Christian
­ity. Everything about that religion’s progressive growth is con
­
11
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trary to Gibbon’s conception of the
 
value of  order and modera ­
tion. But despite the vehemence with which he attacks the
 Christian faith, it must be urged that he is 
ever
 consistent, for  
the fanatical votaries of Mohammedanism, whose efforts to
 spread the Islamic faith involved them in almost constant war
­fare, are likewise brought within his line of fire. The Moham
­medan holy war, with its bloody conquests and riotous plunder
­ing, is of the utmost repugnance to a man of Gibbon’s
 temperament. In Mohammedanism, too, the historian criticizes
 the concept that the Koran is a divine production, as well as the
 beliefs surrounding the miraculous journeys and performances
 of the prophet himself. Just as he earlier ridicules the vain
 attempts of Christian ecclesiastics to decide the nature of life
 after death, so Gibbon disparages the pronouncements of the
 Mohammedan commentators on that subject.
In conclusion it may be stated that Gibbon does not, as some
 
critics have maintained, use the vehicle of a Roman history to
 settle a private account with the Christian religion. As a repre
­sentative of the best of the eighteenth century, his intellectual
 outlook is, above all, ordered and reasonable, and as a result of
 this outlook those chapters of the History of the Decline and
 Fall of the Roman Empire which deal with ecclesiastical matters
 are in complete accord with the social and political philosophies
 that underlie the entire work.
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